Change! Strengthening the Resilience of British Cities in Preparation for Future Pandemics by Boyle, Mark et al.
Heseltine Institute COVID-19 
Project: Working Paper
Change! Strengthening the Resilience of British 
Cities in Preparation for Future Pandemics




For most of 2020, the United Kingdom 
government failed in its mission to 
suppress the SARS-nCoV-2 2019 virus 
and stop COVID-19 from becoming a 
national disaster. Spectators watched with 
incredulity as the world’s fifth largest 
economy recoiled from death rates that 
ranked amongst the worst in the world. A 
cornucopian ‘miracle’ – an effective 
vaccine developed at ‘warp speed’ – has 
pulled us back from the brink. But recent 
success cannot and must not erase or 
obfuscate prior failure; history instructs 
that countries which rely on technological 
fixes to engineer themselves out of trouble 
rarely fail forward. 
If we are to emerge from the pandemic 
stronger, it is imperative that we get to the 
bottom of why the United Kingdom failed 
the COVID-19 test and what failure tells 
us about what the government needs to fix 
if it is to strengthen the resilience of the 
country in preparation for future pandemic 
events.  
On May 11th 2021, United Kingdom PM, 
Boris Johnson, confirmed that an 
independent public inquiry with statutory 
powers would be launched to investigate 
‘rigorously and candidly’ the government’s 
response to the COVID-19 global 
pandemic but intimated that owing to the 
ongoing threat of new variants no inquiry 
would be take place until at the earliest 
spring 2022. Political opponents and 
critics – including and in particular the 
COVID-19 Bereaved Families for Justice 
Group – have argued that nothing less 
than an immediate and full statutory public 
inquiry will suffice. Delay could cost lives.  
Adjournment is both understandable and 
regrettable. For researchers, it does at 
least have the virtue of opening up a 
window of time to generate an adequate 
evidential base from which lessons can be 
extracted. It is imperative that forensic 
diagnoses precede and guide 
remediation. Amidst a deluge of 
manifestos claiming to know how afflicted 
countries might ‘reimagine, rebuild, and 
recover’ and ‘build back better’, we would 
do well to heed Amaryta Sen’s sage 
advice that when it comes to people living 
in precarity and poverty, ‘a misconceived 
theory can kill’. In our case, this is true, 
literally.  
It is incumbent on the research community 
to exploit the likely interregnum, then, to 
ensure that when it is eventually 
convened, any public inquiry has at its 
disposal an archive of high quality, 
intelligence-led submissions. The 
University of Liverpool’s Heseltine Institute 
is dedicated to the project of strengthening 
the resilience of cities – and in particular 
former industrial cities and city regions in 
the throes of regeneration, such as the 
Liverpool City Region – in anticipation of 
future pandemics. The first working paper 
to emerge from an ongoing research 
project in support of this commitment, this 
report is intended to serve as a first 
instalment in the Heseltine Institute’s 
contribution to such an archive. 
In this report, we will address four key 
questions:  
• On the basis of which metrics has
the United Kingdom government
failed the COVID-19 test?
• What might we miss if we blame
failure only on government
ineptitude?
• Why has the United Kingdom
failed the COVID-19 test?
• What does failure tell us about
what the United Kingdom
government needs to fix?
2. Methodological parameters
The methodological limits of our study 
merit stating from the outset, to orient the 
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reader to what this report does and does 
not do; indeed, what it can and cannot do. 
• The focus of this report is confined to 
the public health crisis and its 
remediation: the considerable 
challenge of strengthening the 
resilience of the United Kingdom in 
preparation for future pandemics. A 
more substantial contemplation on 
‘building back better’ would require us 
to attend to COVID-19’s cascading 
economic, social and environmental 
aftershocks but these concerns fall 
beyond the scope of this particular 
study.  
• Our approach is predicated upon a 
global compartive study. We ask: what 
can we learn from interrogating the 
efficacy of the United Kingdom 
government’s response in relation to 
the efficacy of the responses of 
international peers? To understand 
what went wrong in the United 
Kingdom we cannot study only the 
United Kingdom. Only by 
understanding the progenitors of 
COVID-19’s global geographies will 
we be in a position to ask the right 
questions and understand why and 
how, in our case, particular 
determinants which we know to be 
causally significant globally combined 
with local determinants to amplify the 
prevalence and lethality of COVID-19. 
• Throughout the pandemic, the Office 
for National Statistics published 
trustworthy data on COVID-19 cases 
and deaths in the United Kingdom. 
Alas, not every country has met such a 
quality threshold. The World Health 
Organization (WHO), Johns Hopkins 
Coronavirus Resource Centre (CRC), 
the US Centre for Disease Control 
(CDC) and the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) provide the most authoritative, 
up-to-date data on COVID-19 at the 
global scale. But each warns that 
because reporting criteria and testing 
capacity vary between countries, it is 
highly likely that countries with poor 
data infrastructures or particularly 
politicised census offices will be under-
reporting the extent to which they have 
been impacted by the outbreak. This 
said, there is no reason to suppose 
that data collected in other OECD 
countries is especially inferior or 
misleading. Moreover, some Global 
South countries have excellent 
epidemiological data infrastructures 
and we must not generalise. In 
addition, death certification is (even if 
only to an extent) universally practised 
and standardised (at present, still to 
the WHO’s ICD 10th Revision) and 
statistics on mortality are likely to yield 
more meaningful insights than those 
on cases.  
• Our method of investigation is 
predicated upon a search for 
plausibility, not causality. We identify a 
wide range of conjectures and test 
these conjectures, probing for 
refutations. This method can certainly 
help us to sift and sort possible causal 
factors into those which appear to be 
more and those which appear to be 
less compelling. But the data 
assembled – comprising a diverse 
range of data sets, collected by 
different organisations and published 
in multiple formats – does not permit 
definitive conclusions to be reached, at 
least for now. 
• By admission, our investigation suffers 
from a degree of methodological 
nationalism and glosses over 
important sub-‘national’ variations in . 
how each of the nations of the UK – 
and to a lesser degree, the devolved 
administrations in England – have 
handled the pandemic in distinctive 
ways and witnessed different 
outcomes. At times we will speak 
about responses that only pertain to 
the English case. Nevertheless, the 
significance of these differences 
diminishes when all juridstictions are 
 
                   Page 4 
cast in international relief and the 
conclusions we reach ought to be 
relevant across the United Kingdom. 
• Undertaking scholarship which tries to 
make sense of a pandemic unfolding 
in real time is itself a hazardous 
endeavour. What needs emphasising 
is that this report has been written 
whilst the pandemic continues to 
unfold. Nevertheless, the world 
historical import of the pandemic and 
the extent of its impact on the United 
Kingdom dictates that analysis be 
undertaken, even if it runs the risk of 
being overtaken by events.   
 
3. On the basis of which metrics can 
the United Kingdom government be 
said to have failed the COVID-19 
test? 
On December 31st, 2019, the Wuhan 
Municipal Health Commission reported to 
the WHO the existence of a cluster of 
pneumonia cases in Wuhan, Hubei 
Province, China. Eventually, the novel 
coronavirus (severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2, or SARS‐CoV‐
2), a highly contagious airborne 
communicable disease with an estimated 
case fatality rate of 1–2%, was identified 
as the pathogen responsible. By January 
30th 2020, WHO reported that they were 
aware of a total of 7,818 cases across 18 
countries (but almost all in China) and 43 
recorded deaths (again, almost all in 
China). That same day, WHO declared 
coronavirus 2019 (COVID‐19) a Public 
Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC). By March 11th 2020, 
118,000 cases had been recorded in 110 
countries, resulting in over 19,000 deaths. 
On that day, WHO upgraded COVID‐19 to 
the status of a global pandemic. 
The first case of COVID-19 in the United 
Kingdom was confirmed on January 31st 
2020 and the first death on March 5th 
2020. Subsequently, the country has 
witnessed three distinctive waves and 
associated spikes (Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4).  
The first wave began in earnest in early 
March 2020. Daily cases peaked on April 
26th 2020 at 4,846 new confirmed cases 
per day, whilst daily confirmed deaths 
peaked at 983 per day on April 15th. From 
these highs, the United Kingdom 
government began to supress the 
pandemic and by June had succeeded in 
flattening the curve. By July 6th confirmed 
cases had fallen to 356 per day, whilst 
confirmed deaths troughed at seven per 
day on August 21st.  
Notwithstanding this progress, from July 
31st and especially from August 31st 2020, 
confirmed cases began to rise again, and 
from September 5th 2020, so too 
confirmed deaths. This second wave 
finally peaked on November 10th 2020 at 
22,785 confirmed cases (on that day) and 
November 28th at 486 confirmed deaths 
(on that day). By December 3rd 2020, this 
had fallen to 14,237 confirmed cases (on 
that day) and by December 15th confirmed 
deaths troughed at 411 (on that day). 
Respite was to be short-lived. As winter 
took hold and especially across the 2020 
Christmas period, a third wave developed 
which proved to be more severe than the 
first two. A sharp rise in cases led to 
peaks of 59,809 confirmed cases on 
January 10th (on that day) and 1,263 
confirmed deaths on January 24th (on that 
day). From these heights the pandemic 
has steadily been brought under control – 
greatly accelerated by a rapidly deployed 
and ‘best in class’ vaccine programme. On 
May 21st 2021, the United Kingdom 
recorded just 1,595 confirmed cases and 
six confirmed deaths.  
When set into international relief, it is 
evident that the United Kingdom has 
witnessed a very high number of 
confirmed cumulative COVID-19 cases 
per capita and ranks amongst the world’s 
poorest performers in terms of cumulative 
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COVID-19 deaths per capita (Figures 5 
and 6 and Map 1).  
As of May 21st 2020, the United Kingdom 
had recorded no fewer than 4.47 million 
confirmed cases and 127,912 confirmed 
deaths (or 65,971 confirmed cases per 
million and 1,899 confirmed deaths per 
million). For context, that same day, 
globally, 166.5 million confirmed cases 
had been recorded with 3.44 million 
confirmed deaths (or 23,314 confirmed 
cases per million and 441 confirmed 
deaths per million). By comparison, the 
OECD countries had recorded 93.6 million 
confirmed cases and 1,855,421 confirmed 
deaths (or 67,932 confirmed cases per 
million and 1,360 confirmed deaths per 
million); whilst the European Union (EU 
28) had recorded 31.4 million confirmed 
cases and 718,056 confirmed deaths (or 
72,315 cases per million and 1,613 deaths 
per million).  
With only 0.8% of the global population, 
the United Kingdom has presided over 
2.6% of confirmed cases and 3.7% of 
confirmed deaths. With only 4.5% of the 
OECD population, it has registered 4.7% 
of confirmed cases and 6.9% of confirmed 
deaths. And with only 12.9% of the EU28 
population, it has witnessed 14.2% of 
confirmed cases and 17.8% of confirmed 
deaths. 
Perhaps a more realistic evaluation of the 
United Kingdom’s encounter with COVID-
19, pre-vaccine, can be gleaned by 
confining attention to, say, the 12-month 
period from March 5th 2020 (the date of 
the first death in the UK) to March 5th 2021 
(by which point its vaccine roll-out was 
gathering pace). Yet, when bracketed to 
these dates, the United Kingdom’s relative 
rankings deteriorate further. Even if 
compared only with other Global North 
countries with high GDP per capita and 
very high HDI scores and countries with 
large population sizes, ageing population 
structures, and concentrated poverty, the 
United Kingdom presents as an especially 
‘at risk’ country, occupying leading 
positions in global, OECD and EU league 
tables (Figures 6-11). 
The UK in global context 
(Global n = 133, OECD n = 37, EU n = 28) 
Cumulative cases per million  
March 5th 2020 to March 5th 2021 
 
Global rank      17th  
OECD rank      9th  
EU rank           11th  
March 5th 2020 to September 5th 2020 
 
Global rank     19th  
OECD rank     10th  
EU rank           11th 
September 5th 2020 to March 5th 2021 
 
Global rank     16th  
OECD rank      9th  
EU rank            9th 
Cumulative deaths per million  
March 5th 2020 to March 5th 2021 
 
Global rank       4th  
OECD rank       4th   
EU rank             4th 
 
Rank relative to top 20 countries … 
 
by GDP per capita                                 2nd  
by HDI score                                          2nd  
by population size                                  1st  
with high % of people living beneath the 
poverty line                                             1st  
with a high % of people aged > 70.        3rd  
March 5th 2020 to September 5th 2020 
 
Global rank        4th  
OECD rank        3rd  
EU rank              3rd  
September 5th 2020 to March 5th 2021 
 
Global rank        4th  
OECD rank        4th  
EU rank              4th  
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4. What might we miss if we blame 
failure only on government 
ineptitude? 
Providing a robust explanation for a 
phenomenon as complex as a nation 
state’s resilience to a global pandemic 
constitutes a challenging research 
problem. Such a problem is unlikely to 
yield to cheap conclusions; if we are to 
untangle and appraise the complex brew 
of potential causal variables which have 
been mooted, a considerable and 
painstaking job of work lies ahead. 
Any future public inquiry will undoubtedly 
focus upon the United Kingdom 
government’s handling of the pandemic, 
and government ineptitude and at times 
administrative incompetence has 
undoubtedly played a role in generating 
very poor outcomes. But it would be a 
cardinal mistake to reduce it to such. 
When set into international relief, the 
United Kingdom’s particularly deleterious 
encounter with COVID-19 was no outlier 
or aberration. At least to date, COVID-19 
has been especially troubling for many 
Global North countries and in particular 
liberal capitalist democracies in the OECD 
world. This observation raises an 
uncomfortable reality: unless 
mismanagement has been ubiquitous 
across – and significantly confined to – the 
OECD world, something more systemic 
and structural must be at play. 
In this section we will argue that focussing 
on the efficacy of the United Kingdom 
government’s response is both necessary 
and insufficient. That response must be 
set into context. We offer the provocation 
that four decades of neoliberalism and 
market fundamentalism has ingrained 
within many advanced capitalist 
economies legacies and logics which now 
combine to create a hostile environment 
for effective public health interventions. 
British neoliberalism, in particular, has 
proven an inadequate and actively harmful 
foundation for crisis management and 
hampered the United Kingdom’s response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic.   
The role of government Ineptitude  
In his book The COVID-19 Catastrophe: 
What’s Gone Wrong and How to Stop It 
Happening Again, editor-in-chief of The 
Lancet, Richard Horton (2020), argues 
that the elevated impact of COVID-19 in 
the United Kingdom reflects, at root, 
government incompetence. For too long 
the pandemic was written off as no worse 
than the flu, supplies of virus-related 
products were in short supply, test, track 
and trace procedures were introduced too 
late and were inadequate, poorly 
conceptualised ideas of ‘herd immunity’ 
guided responses, international air travel 
continued, and mask wearing was 
optional. Horton argues that it is 
erroneous to imply that COVID-19 was 
unexpected: in fact, epidemiologists have 
been warning governments for years 
about the imminent threat of airborne 
communicable disease. For Horton, 
COVID-19 stands as the greatest science 
policy failure in a generation. 
It would be disingenuous to say that the 
United Kingdom government failed to 
intervene to protect lives and livelihoods 
during the pandemic. A number of 
prolonged national lockdowns were 
introduced and significant economic 
support packages were created to provide 
some help to employers and employees 
disrupted by the crisis. And the 
government’s investment in vaccine 
development and the roll-out of its 
vaccination programme has rightly been 
acclaimed. But, a case can be made that, 
especially throughout 2020, the 
government failed to act with the 
necessary speed, stringency or 
coordination to adequately limit the spread 
of the virus, enabling it to circulate within 
the community and exert a high death toll 
on the population. Measures taken have 
too often been ‘too little, too late’; reluctant 
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concession to the spiralling crisis, rather 
than positive, pro-active and pre-emptive 
intervention at the earliest opportunity. 
The Oxford COVID-19 Government 
Response Tracker (OxCGRT) 
demonstrates clearly how the speed at 
which containment measures – such as 
international travel bans and lockdowns, 
mass testing, contact tracing, and 
mandatory mask wearing – have been 
adopted, has been critical to preventing 
the spread of the virus. While other 
governments around the world 
immediately, or even pre-emptively, 
introduced effective measures to curb the 
virus as reported cases began to rise, the 
United Kingdom government’s response 
was hesitant and delayed, leaving the 
country behind the curve and playing 
catch-up. For example, after initially 
introducing a series of international travel 
measures from late January onwards, the 
United Kingdom government withdrew all 
border measures between 13th March 
2020 and 8th June 2020. Moreover, the 
UK’s first national lockdown did not come 
into effect until 26th March 2020, almost 
two months after the first local cases were 
recorded and when over 1,800 people had 
already died of the virus. The second and 
third national lockdowns (on October 31st 
and January 6th) also came only after 
cases and deaths were surging.   
Testing capacity has been inadequate. On 
April 10th 2020, the United Kingdom’s 
positivity rate (the share of tests returning 
a positive result) stood at 30% and it took 
until May 7th 2020 for the country to 
secure a positivity rate beneath the WHO 
recommended 5%. And from October 8th 
to January 27th, as the second and third 
waves unfolded, positivity rates once 
again exceeded 5%, climbing to as high 
as 12.8% on January 4th 2020. In 
England, contact tracing was initially 
carried out by Public Health England, 
working with local authorities. However, 
on 12th March 2020, as the number of 
cases in the community outstripped 
testing and tracing capacity, widespread 
contact tracing was stopped and 
resources reserved for those in hospitals 
and other high-risk settings. A new 
system, NHS Test and Trace, was 
launched on 28th May 2020 to increase 
national capacity. The UK government has 
created an overly complex web of public-
private partnerships that utilised the NHS, 
Public Health England, university and 
military resources, as well as the services 
of private sector firms such as Deloitte, 
G4S, Serco and Amazon. Despite costing 
an estimated £37bn, the British House of 
Commons Public Accounts Select 
Committee has raised concerns about 
delays in the implementation of NHS Test 
and Trace and has suggested that, to 
date, the extent to which it has made a 
difference is unclear.  
It is now apparent that procurement 
practices had not factored into the 
equation the possibility of an airborne 
infectious disease pandemic. Coupled 
with the government’s comparatively slow 
response to the pandemic and the long-
term deficit of a clear, strategic industrial 
policy (and the withering of domestic 
manufacturing capacity and related 
domestic supply chains), the UK has been 
exposed to endemic shortages of vital 
personal protective equipment (PPE) for 
health workers, ventilators, and other key 
medical supplies. This meant the UK was 
left to fight for supplies on the global 
market amidst unprecedented demand. 
This led to farcical scenes, such as the 
shipment of PPE purchased for the NHS 
from Turkey which, once flown to the UK 
by the Royal Air Force and after much 
ministerial fanfare, was found to fall short 
of UK quality standards. These shortages 
of key equipment may have contributed to 
the UK’s slow adoption of public mask-
wearing as a way to limit the spread of the 
virus. Indeed, concerns that public mask-
wearing would threaten the supply of PPE 
to healthcare workers were highlighted by 
SAGE and meant that the 
 
                   Page 8 
recommendation for the public to wear 
masks was delayed significantly. Wearing 
a face covering only became compulsory 
on public transport in England and at NHS 
facilities across the UK on June 15th 2020, 
and in shops and supermarkets in 
England on July 24th 2020.  
What can COVID-19’s global 
geographies teach us? 
It is not yet entirely clear how, in the end, 
the burdens of the global pandemic will be 
distributed geographically and who will be 
most impacted, where, why, when, in what 
ways, and with what consequences. 
Emerging COVID‐19 geographies at all 
scales already signal the likelihood of a 
highly variegated and complex outcome. 
No world region or given politico‐
economic‐institutional model is liable to 
exit the pandemic unscathed; all have to 
varying degrees been humbled.   
Nevertheless, at least to date, COVID-19 
appears to have been more of a 
communicable disease of the OECD world 
than one of the Global South. Against all 
expectations, COVID-19 has impacted 
more severely (as measured by both 
morbidity and mortality rates) Global North 
countries with (very) high levels of human 
development than Global South countries 
with (very) low levels of human 
development. In particular, advanced 
liberal capitalist democracies – OECD 
countries, and especially the United 
States, United Kingdom and European 
Union (EU) member states – appear to 
have borne a heavy burden. It is shocking 
to witness wealthy countries with strong 
institutional capacity, which hitherto had 
been understood to have reached the 
‘finish line’ of the epidemiological 
transition, consistently rank at the top of 
the league table of the world’s most 
impacted states, both in terms of absolute 
cases and deaths and cases and deaths 
per million.  
With only 18% of the global population, 
OECD countries constitute 56.1% of 
confirmed cases and 53.9 % of confirmed 
deaths, whilst with only 5.7% of the global 
population, the EU has endured 36.2% of 
confirmed cases and 19.7% of confirmed 
deaths. The top ten countries by death 
rates per million are all OECD countries 
and 18 of the top 25 belong to the OECD 
world. Furthermore, nine of the top 25 
countries by mortality per million are 
members of the EU (EU28), whilst 16 of 
the top 25 are from the EU. 
We hypothesise that the COVID-19 crisis 
in the UK is not just an outcome of 
administrative mismanagement, but is 
also a product of long-term systemic 
failures driven by the logics and legacies 
of neoliberalism. In order to build back 
better from the pandemic, the UK will 
require a new guiding understanding of 
the role of the state that is fundamentally 
post-neoliberal in design. 
Of course, it is necessary to qualify and 
temper such an assertion by attending to 
variations in the prevalence and lethality 
of COVID-19 across capitalism’s 
geographies. By and large, corporatist-
statist (European) and social democratic 
(Nordic) capitalisms have weathered the 
storm better than liberal laissez-faire 
market (liberal meritocratic) capitalisms. 
But again, due diligence is required.  
• Whilst many liberal market economies 
have witnessed relatively poor 
outcomes (United States, United 
Kingdom, Chile), some have enjoyed 
comparatively better results (Australia 
and Canada). 
• Equally, whilst many co-ordinated 
market economies have performed 
relatively poorly (France, Belgium, 
Spain), others have achieved better 
outcomes (for example, Japan, Taiwan 
South Korea and to an extent 
Germany and the Netherlands). 
• Moreover, whilst the social democratic 
Nordic countries of Norway, Denmark 
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and Finland (and here we place too 
New Zealand) have performed well, 
Sweden has trodden a different path 
and presided over poorer outcomes. 
We might also take instruction from 
countries that have recently and / or are 
currently in the throes of transitioning to 
market rule and who have, or who are 
currently courting, neoliberal reform. 
• For most of 2020, the hybrid market 
economies of Eastern Europe 
appeared to have had escaped the 
worst of the pandemic. But more 
recently they have witnessed 
extraordinary waves and peaks and 
are now among the most adversely 
affected (Hungary, Poland, Czechia 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Macedonia).   
• Beyond the advanced capitalist 
economies, the virus has exacted a 
very heavy toll in Latin America –  
historically the most developed region 
within the Global South – impacting in 
particular Peru, Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Panama 
and Bolivia. Of course, of all the 
continents, Latin America has been 
most impacted by the Washington 
Consensus  development agenda, and 
from the 1970s and 1980s has been 
on the receiving end of a suite of 
neoliberal Structural Adjustment 
Programmes. In consequence, Latin 
America has some of the sharpest 
wealth and income inequalities in the 
world.  
• Many East Asian states have proven 
capable of mounting fast and effective 
responses to the pandemic (including 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan).  
Given that the countries straddling this 
region encompass a wide range of 
politico-economic-institutional models, 
the implication may be that a 
specifically ‘Asian’ cultural factor is at 
work. 
• That said, given their greater capacity 
and latitude to swiftly impose highly 
stringent and effective lockdowns 
among their populations, it has 
become popular to assert that 
authoritarian governance models lie 
behind the comparative success of 
states such as China and Vietnam in 
suppressing the virus. But equally, the 
Russian model of command capitalism 
and the autocratic patriarchal 
monarchies and theocracies which 
prevail in the Arabian Peninsula and 
near East (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, 
Iran and Yemen) have been less 
succesfull in controlling the pandemic. 
Are some authoritarian states more 
effective than others? 
• African exceptionalism is perhaps the 
most surprising feature of COVID-19’s 
geographies. South Africa and Libya 
present as an exception in the wider 
African narrative, being amongst the 
most severely impacted countries in 
the world. Otherwise, it comes as a 
welcome surprise that, against all 
odds, it is the countries which hitherto 
have been perceived to be especially 
vulnerable to communicable disease – 
Sub-Saharan African countries 
(including the very poor and very 
populous countries of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Malawi and 
Nigeria) – which at least to this point 
have escaped the worst of the 
pandemic. Conditions do not inspire 
confidence that Africa will emerge from 
the pandemic unscathed however; the 
puzzle is how it has managed to 
outperform OECD countries to this 
point.   
 
The legacies of neoliberalism 
Our provocation then, is that the United 
Kingdom’s failure to respond effectively to 
the pandemic is not just an accident of 
administrative mishandling or 
carelessness, but a predictable 
consequence of the country’s decades-
long experiment with neoliberalism and 
the corrosive effects this has had on the 
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public realm, community cohesion and the 
political imagination.   
The ingrained norms, logics, and social 
consequences of neoliberalism have 
contributed significantly to the United 
Kingdom’s (comparatively) weak and 
hesitant response to the pandemic, 
creating a hostile environment to effective 
public health intervention. The United 
Kingdom government’s response must 
surely be seen as a consequence of 
deeply ingrained and instinctual prejudice 
against state activism in social and 
economic life. A philosophical 
presumption against state interference 
has helped give rise to a flat-footed and 
reticent state response to the crisis, whilst 
the legacies of inequality and austerity 
have corroded the resilience of 
communities as well as their trust in the 
state and its ability (and responsibility) to 
intervene in crisis. 
The pandemic has added a fresh 
existential threat (without historical 
precedent) to the catalogue of problems 
that OECD countries were grappling with 
up until yesterday – which were, and 
which remain, momentous in themselves. 
A century of de-industrialisation, forty 
years of liberalised market 
fundamentalism and boom and bust 
economics, and the 2008 global financial 
crash and subsequent period of austerity, 
have combined to seed a combustible 
brew of growing inequalities, declining 
social solidarity, alienation from the 
political system and populist nationalism. 
Uneven geographical development and 
socio-spatial inequalities have given rise 
to a more polarised and polarising politics 
and growing dissonance between 
representative democracy and popular 
sovereignty. ‘Whiteshift’ has fuelled the 
rise of right-wing populism and given birth 
to a new politics of hospitality. A climate 
and ecological emergency threatens us 
with ecocide. A mental health tsunami 
signals distress among the citizenry. And 
corporate media and digital 
communications have depleted the public 
square, giving birth to a dangerous new 
post-truth era. 
These historical dynamics are especially 
evident in a post-imperial United Kingdom, 
a heartland of neoliberalism and market 
fundamentalism. The decline of empire 
and rise of a new international division of 
labour has etched an indelible imprint on 
the geography of the space economy, 
leaving a much-discussed North-South 
divide, although in reality spatial injustice 
and disparities in living standards are 
distributed in complex ways at a variety of 
scales throughout the entire country. An 
overly centralised state and an aggressive 
neoliberal economic policy has led to an 
accelerated growth of the UK’s capital city 
as a cosmopolitan ‘alpha’ global city and 
global financial services centre whilst de-
industrialisation of once vibrant imperial 
industrial workshops and port cities, in 
particular northern English city-regions, 
has led to declining and alienated ‘left 
behind’ ‘rustbelt regions’ with limited 
futures. Caustic voices now challenge the 
right of the representative regime to enjoy 
custody over democracy. Distrust of 
politicians and dis-alignment of political 
parties from their bases, has led many to 
register their disaffection with the political 
status quo by voting to ‘Brexit’ from the 
EU. Inequality has sabotaged solidarity 
and eroded social capital. ‘Whiteshift’ has 
aggravated these trends and heightened a 
sense of estrangement within migrant 
communities. Notwithstanding claims of a 
global Britain, isolationism and 
protectionism lurk and changing attitudes 
to international trade posture as potential 
obstacles to accelerated global 
cooperation. 
Our hypothesis then is that the COVID-19 
pandemic has cruelly exposed the failings 
of the neoliberal system cultivated in the 
United Kingdom in recent decades. This 
system has hollowed out the state, making 
it slow and less responsive in its 
responsibilities to protect the wellbeing of 
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citizens. It has hollowed out the economy, 
making it less resilient to disruptive shocks 
and less dynamic in the wake of crisis. 
And it has hollowed out communities, 
allowing inequalities to metastasise to an 
extent that has undermined lives and 
livelihoods across the country. As we seek 
to build back better from the pandemic, we 
must recognise that this system is on 
critical life support and is no longer fit for 
purpose. As the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights summarised following a visit 
to the UK in 2019: 
“The bottom line is that much of the glue 
that has held British society together since 
the Second World War has been 
deliberately removed and replaced with a 
harsh and uncaring ethos” (United Nations 
2019, 1). 
5. Why has the United Kingdom 
failed the COVID-19 test? 
The field of Hazards Studies provides 
intellectual resources which can help us to 
better understand the ways in which the 
underlying health of the western market 
democratic polity has worked in parallel 
with immediate, proximate and contingent 
drivers that are bespoke – in our case to 
the United Kingdom.  
Any thesis that tries to explain the United 
Kingdom’s disastrous Covid-19 outcomes 
with reference to the government’s 
weddedness to a neoliberal liberal 
meritocratic politico-economic-institutional 
model will need to be able to explain 
exactly how this model has impaired and 
jeopardised the government’s ability to 
respond effectively to the pandemic. 
Asserting a link that requires a leap of 
imagination from the reader is not 
sufficient – the connection needs to be 
thought through and clearly demonstrated. 
Through what mechanisms exactly has 
forty years of neoliberalism conspired to 
render the United Kingdom a less 
hospitable environment for public health 
intervention and a more hospitable 
environment for Covid-19? 
To further our case, we argue that the risk 
of being harmed by COVID-19 is a 
function of both ‘fundamental conditions’ 
and ‘proximate determinants’. These two 
domains are independent but functionally 
related. The causal significance of 
fundamental conditions is complicated and 
far from linear. Fundamental conditions 
refer to the efficacy and health of the 
prevailing politico-economic-institutional 
model – in the case of the United Kingdom 
liberal democratic market rule, and in 
particular the neoliberal variant of this 
model that has been preferred by 
successive governments since 1979. But 
social, economic, political and cultural 
contexts work through, alongside and 
occasionally in opposition to, a wider and 
more complex brew of proximate 
determinants.  
Countries will be at heightened risk of 
harm from COVID-19 when fundamental 
conditions inflate the impact of proximate 
determinants and proximate determinants 
expose and aggravate structural 
precarities. A perfect storm will be the 
inevitable result: countries that find 
themselves in this position will be most 
likely to turn a COVID-19 hazard into a 
disaster, and a COVID-19 disaster into a 
catastrophe. 
The overarching framework guiding our 
approach can be summarised using the 
formula: 
Risk = Fundamental Conditions in union 
with Proximate Determinants 
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Risk: the likelihood, or the probability, 
that COVID-19 will lead to a given level 
of harm and loss in a given country. 
 
Fundamental conditions: the efficacy 
and performance of the prevailing 
politico-economic-institutional model in 
that country. 
Proximate determinants: the wide 
range of immediate or direct progenitors 
(epidemiological, demographic, health, 
social, economic, political, and 
environmental) which have combined to 
put that country in harm’s way. 
 
The proximate determinants of COVID-
19’s geographies are then broken down 
as follows: 
 
Proximate Determinants = Exposure x 
Vulnerability (Immunity Status + 
Susceptibility + Preparedness) x 
Response 
 




Exposure: the location of a country with 
respect to the origin and uneven 
diffusion of COVID-19. 
 
Vulnerability: systemic weaknesses 
which render some populations more 
vulnerable and predisposed to feel the 
full ferocity of COVID-19. 
 
Immunity status: vulnerabilities 
wrought by variations in population 
wide levels of immunity to SARS- 
nCoV-2 2019. 
 
Susceptibility: social, political, 
cultural, and economic processes 
which marginalise and impoverish 
some social groups to the extent that 
their existence is so precarious that 
small setbacks have significant 
consequences. 
 
Preparedness: the calibre of prior 
disaster risk management 
institutions, infrastructure and plans.  
 
Response: the competence of those 
responsible for coordinated emergency 
management in real time. 
 
In what sense might these fundamental 
conditions have increased the exposure of 
(neo)liberalised market democracies – 
and in particular the United Kingdom – to 
the SARS- nCoV-2 2019 virus, rendered 
these economies more vulnerable to being 
harmed by COVID‐19, and diminished the 
adequacy of national responses? To 
explore this question, we gather together 
a variety of conjectures (24 are 
considered here) that have been 
ruminated over in academic, political and 
practitioner literature and in the popular 
media. Our orientation is to refute each 
conjecture by amassing evidence which 
reveals its limitations. When refutation 
proves difficult, we conclude that a 
particular conjecture continues to present 
as a potential candidate and merits further 
scrutiny.  
Appendix 2 provides a summary of our 
provisional conclusions (for further details, 
see also the addendum to this working 
paper). This table employs a traffic light 
system to summarise our findings: green 
is used to colour code conjectures we 
judge to be most compelling, orange for 
those we consider to be suggestive but in 
need of clearer supporting evidence, and 
red for those we find to be most wanting. 
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This traffic light system is a heuristic 
device for orientation only – as and when 
further data and evidence emerges, the 
actual importance of each of the 
conjectures we place under scrutiny will 
undoubtedly become more apparent. 
Our capstone is that neoliberalism has 
proven an inadequate and actively harmful 
foundation for state governance of crisis, 
principally because it has denuded the 
appetite and capacity of the United 
Kingdom government to prepare for and 
take the steps necessary to curtail a 
pandemic event, and broken the social 
compact required to furnish the state with 
the kind of social license it would require 
to enact effective interventions. But its 
impact has worked through a number of 
localised progenitors of poor outcomes 
that are rooted in but which cannot be 
reduced in any simple way to the 
prevailing politico-economic-institutional 
model. This leads to the conclusion that 
we must hold in tension ‘build back better’ 
strategies which seek to change the 
fundamental conditions in which public 
health interventions work, and which 
recognise that because the political-
economic-institutional context is only 
contingently related to (at least some) 
localised progenitors of COVID-19 
outcomes, there is much we can do in the 
interim. 
6. What does failure tell us about 
what the United Kingdom needs to 
fix if it is to fall forward 
The concept of resilience is central to 
disaster risk reduction. But what does 
building resilience actually mean? 
Resilience is understood variously in both 
academic and practitioner communities. 
This matters; framings play a crucial role 
in shaping the kinds of resilience-building 
strategies which might be imagined and 
enacted. We use the term ‘resilience 
politics’ to refer to the differential 
consequences of different perspectives on 
how to build resilience in the wake of a 
disaster and against the backdrop of a 
looming risk or hazard. When rebuilding 
societies in the name of strengthening 
resilience, political leaders need to 
recognise that they are making political 
choices about the kind of future they are 
working to create.  
• Resilience as robustness scrutinises 
the amount of shock a system can 
absorb and continue to function 
effectively and works to strengthen the 
resistance of systems to external 
disturbances.  
• Resilience as recovery focuses upon 
the capacity of systems to return to a 
steady initial equilibrium state after a 
shock and prioritises solutions which 
help systems heal and repair faster. 
• Resilience as reform re-centres 
attention upon the capacity of systems 
after a shock to adapt and evolve so 
that they are stronger than before and 
emphasises reform within the same 
politico-institutional norm. 
• Resilience as redesign brings to the 
fore the necessity of reconfiguring 
systems root-and-branch after a shock 
and affords priority to politico-
institutional transformation as the only 
lasting solution. 
Clearly, robustness, recovery, reform and 
reconstruction all have strengths and 
weaknesses in different contexts. 
Engineering systems so that they might 
increase their immunity to external 
disturbances affords reassuring protection 
but there will be hazards which overwhelm 
even the strongest of vaccines and in 
these instances resistance will be futile. 
Helping vulnerable populations recover 
from a disaster is a worthy endeavour but 
not if it merely serves to preserve the 
social, economic, cultural, and political 
processes that produced precarity in the 
first instance. Strengthening the rights of 
citizens by reforming the existing political 
order is obviously a welcome development 
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but not if it produces tokenistic transfers of 
power that only marginally reduce risk. 
Finally, transforming societies so as to 
address the root causes of precarity may 
provide the only durable solution to 
human-induced vulnerability but it is 
questionable whether deep-seated 
societal reconstruction is wise in times of 
existing upheaval or in the immediate 
aftermath. 
The idea that the COVID-19 pandemic is a 
moment that the United Kingdom must 
build back better from is one that has 
gained traction across the political 
spectrum, and has even been referenced 
by the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, as 
an ambition for the nation’s post-pandemic 
recovery. This suggests that post-
pandemic recovery will require a process 
of transformation and improvement; 
rebuilding the UK’s economy and society 
to be both different and superior to the 
status quo found pre-pandemic. However, 
so far, there has been insufficient 
consideration of what successfully building 
back better actually means, and requires, 
politically. 
We conclude by extracting early and 
provisional lessons to emerge from this 
project. We argue that if we are to emerge 
from COVID-19 stronger, it will be 
necessary to attend to the immediate 
causes of failure. And so, if we are to fall 
forward attention will need to be paid also 
to resilience as robustness and recovery.    
But interventions will not be curative until 
they are properly political, doing more 
than compensating for the status quo. We 
will not fortify resilience, nor fall forward, if 
we simply medicate ourselves with 
neoliberal prescriptions and allow our 
response to be limited by parameters 
imposed on us by the existing politico-
economic-institutional model. COVID-19 
points to the importance of resilience as 
reform and perhaps even redesign. There 
is much we can do now to respond, 
reimagine and rebuild (small caps) but 
unless we also Respond, Reimagine and 
Rebuild (large caps), we will be swimming 
against a strong tide, going against the 
grain, and pushing a large rock up a hill. 
Priority Action 1 – For a new social 
compact for disaster risk management  
Given the comparative failure of the UK’s 
neoliberal system to respond adequately 
to the COVID-19 crisis, the foundations for 
post-pandemic renewal, categorically, 
cannot be neoliberal. To double down on 
the norms, logics, and approaches of 
neoliberalism now would only serve to 
rebuild a political order that has been 
shown to be practically, as well as 
ethically, unsound – potentially leaving the 
UK population as at risk from COVID-20 
as it was from COVID-19. The influence of 
neoliberal ideas, policies, and ways of 
thinking on the British state, society, and 
economy have been deeply corrosive, 
both before and during the pandemic. 
Therefore, if we are to truly build back 
better, we must first reject and replace 
neoliberalism as the hegemonic political 
project in the United Kingdom. 
Neoliberalism has proven an inadequate 
and actively harmful foundation for state 
governance of crisis, principally because it 
has broken the social compact between 
the government and the citizenry. Without 
such a compact it is impossible to 
conceive of, let alone enact, an impactful 
public health response to a pandemic 
event.  
At the heart of this dislocation are three 
‘denudations’.  
A denuded state 
In responding to the pandemic, the United 
Kingdom government has had to 
overcome significant cognitive dissonance 
to work against the grain of forty years’ 
worth of embedded neoliberal thinking 
about the roles and responsibilities of the 
British state – that the state should refrain 
from intervening in the lives and 
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livelihoods of citizens; indeed, that doing 
so is vital to protect essential rights and 
liberties, as well as the market. That this 
negative way of thinking about the 
potential of a democratic state has been 
an albatross around the United kingdom’s 
neck is now plain to see. The COVID-19 
pandemic has brought into stark relief the 
inadequacy and incapacity of a British 
state undermined by neoliberal disdain for 
the roles and responsibilities that a 
properly functioning democratic state 
ought to embrace – to proactively promote 
and prioritise the interests of its citizens. 
Left to the exigencies of a dispassionate 
free market and guided by a neoliberal 
prejudice against state intervention, the 
United Kingdom has been made weaker, 
less resilient, and less dynamic in the face 
of the crisis.  
A denuded democracy  
When market relations come to take such 
a central normative role in human life, the 
value and importance of democratic 
participation is diminished. If it is the 
market where we exercise our freedom, 
express our interests, and generate social 
good, what need do we have for 
democratic politics? What if the whims of 
the democratic public could unduly 
influence or upset the function and 
outcomes of free market exchange? The 
neoliberal model therefore promotes a 
denuded public sphere, and an infantilised 
democracy – one in which citizens are not 
understood to be equal, active participants 
in the political life of their communities, but 
instead merely political-consumers who 
(infrequently) have the opportunity to vote 
for electoral candidates and their precisely 
focus-grouped policies and campaign 
slogans. Under neoliberalism, the state is 
not a democratically co-owned and co-
operated enterprise for actively 
discovering and pursuing the common 
good, but merely a tolerated guarantor of 
market functions. And as such, under the 
neoliberal state, the future is not to be 
shaped politically by the needs, 
aspirations and imaginations of 
democratic citizens, but by the aggregated 
economic outcomes of free market 
exchange. 
A denuded citizenry  
Estranged from a highly centralised 
nation-state, and debilitated by growing 
socio-spatial inequalities, diminishing 
social coherence, declining trust in 
politicians and faltering democratic 
polities, a growing climate and ecological 
crisis, and a crisis in mental health, it is 
little surprise that faith in democracy and 
social capital have depleted significantly in 
the United Kingdom. One response has 
been rising rising populist and nationalist 
movements and an increasingly polarised 
and polarising politics, and a more 
inhospitable climate for those deemed 
‘other’ and ‘foreign’. The pandemic has 
exposed the corrosive effects of widening 
inequality and the decline of community, 
mutuality and solidarity. This alienation 
has been further aggravated by the clear 
socio-economic gradient in deaths from 
COVID-19 by class, location and ethnicity. 
Indeed, COVID-19 has been a wildfire, 
able to spread rapidly through 
communities dried out by decades of state 
austerity, deepening poverty, and the 
erosion of trust.  
To truly build back better, the UK must 
now decisively break with the neoliberal 
order. No longer can neoliberal discomfort 
at the idea of state intervention be 
tolerated while lives are put unnecessarily 
at risk. Instead we must offer a confident, 
positive, and optimistic account of the 
democratic state’s potential, and capacity, 
to better promote the health, wealth, and 
wellbeing of people and communities.   
Social democracy describes a particular 
kind of relationship between the state, the 
market, and society – the market is 
embedded within, and guided by, a state-
led framework of regulation and 
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interventionist economic policy to help 
ensure it functions to support the public 
good. The UK government must now 
rediscover the positive potential of 
progressive, prudential, public spending. 
Universalist systems for welfare and social 
insurance, as well as essential public 
services, are established and maintained 
by the state to narrow inequalities and 
improve quality of life. Progressive 
taxation, and the public investment it 
affords, is viewed as conducive to 
progress and development. And this is all 
mediated, and legitimised, through the 
nurturing of a peaceful, open-ended 
democratic culture through which society 
and the economy can be continuously 
improved. 
A new social democratic model fit for the 
twenty first century is needed. According 
to US economist, Joseph Stiglitz, it is 
surely time for world leaders to respond to 
the emerging “global social movement for 
well‐being,” shift from measuring GDP 
growth to “measuring what actually 
counts,” and develop “a market economy 
that works for people and not the other 
way around.” In calling for a radical 
rediscovery of the United Kingdom’s social 
democratic foundations we do not intend 
necessarily to make a nostalgic argument 
that yearns for a return to some perceived 
“golden age” between, say, 1945 and 
1975. Instead we argue that, to build back 
better from the pandemic, the state must 
recapture the spirit and the purpose of 
mid-century social democracy, reinterpret 
how social democratic ideas can be 
relevant in the context of the 2020s, and 
then reimagine the social democratic 
institutional frameworks that underpin our 
politico-economic system. To rebuild the 
trust in the social contract that has been 
so critically eroded by four decades of 
neoliberalism, people must now be given 
a renewed sense of ownership in the 
political and economic life of the society in 
which they live. They must become the 
architects of a renewed social democratic 
state, and the authors of what building 
back better really means. 
For a bespoke United Kingdom Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk 
management (2015-2030) 
The United Nations Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNDRR) is the mandated 
focal point for disaster risk reduction in the 
UN system. The Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 
champions four priorities – understanding 
disaster risk; strengthening disaster risk 
governance to manage disaster risk; 
investing in disaster risk reduction for 
resilience; and enhancing disaster 
preparedness for effective response and 
to ‘build back better’ via recovery, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction. 
The United Nations convenes a biennial 
Global Platform for Disaster Risk 
Reduction to take stock of progress in the 
implementation of the Sendai Framework 
and to share good practices. The next 
Global Platform is scheduled for 2021; it is 
to be expected that the COVID-19 global 
pandemic will have dramatically 
transformed approaches to risk 
management by that point, and it remains 
to be seen if the Sendai approach and 
targets will have to be fundamentally 
rethought before the 2030 end date. 
The United Kingdom can strengthen its 
capacity to manage future disaster events 
– including pandemics – by engaging 
more fully the intellectual, policy and 
practical resources codified in the Sendai 
framework. Here we draw upon some 
Sendai principles and our analytical 
framework and analysis presented above 
to indicate some of actions which might 
countenanced. 
EXPOSURE  
Establish mechanisms to break 
connections between globalised and 
localised flows of people, capital, and 
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goods and the transmission, circulation, 
and diffusion of pathogens. 
• Restore links between public health 
and urban governance / planning / 
place-making (for example by adopting 
innovations such as 2m planning and 
the 15-minute city). 
• Accelerate moves towards Universal 
Basic Income and a future world of 
work where home working and a 
three- or four-day working week 
becomes the norm. 
• Leverage the benefits of online 
shopping. 
• Reconfigure global production 
networks (GPNs) and in particular 
rethink TNC logistics and procurement 
practices. 
• Tackle digital poverty and enhance the 
ability of digital communications to be 
used to equalise rather than aggravate 
social inequality. 
• Exploit innovations in ICT and promote 
new attitudes to international travel.  
VULNERABILITY 
Immunity status 
Fortify the resilience of those placed in 
harm’s way disproportionately due to prior 
underlying health inequalities. 
• Place preventative and anticipatory 
public health intervention at the centre 
of the NHS. Revalorise and 
reinvigorate strategies for healthy 
ageing and for tackling health 
inequalities by delaying until later in 
life the onset of chronic degenerative 
disease, addressing the problem of 
multiple comorbidities. 
• Consider again the merits and 
demerits of universal BCG (and other) 
vaccination programmes. 
Susceptibility  
Fortify the resilience of those placed in 
harm’s way disproportionately due to prior 
underlying socio‐structural disadvantages. 
• Build communities, revalorize social 
capital, prioritise social inclusion, and 
enhance social coherence. 
• Restore public trust and confidence in 
institutions of democracy and 
reinvigorate a healthy public square 
and hopeful, vibrant futurity speech. 
• Reduce wealth and income 
inequalities and sever the link between 
wealth and income by promoting 
genuine equality of opportunity. 
• Align and strengthen multi-scalar 
governance arrangements, fortifying 
the powers and resources of regional 
and local authorities who are closest to 
the people they serve. 
Preparation 
Fortify the resilience of those placed in 
harm’s way disproportionately due to poor 
prior disaster planning and preparation. 
• Engage more fully the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015-2030 and the 
‘Bangkok Principles’ for the 
implementation of the health aspects 
of the framework.   
• Rethink the impact of epidemiological 
transition on disaster risk management 
and health care strategies and 
systems, and reprioritise emerging and 
(re-)emerging infectious disease. 
• Rethink supply chains and build and 
stock large warehouses of essential 
medical supplies, including supplies of 
personal and protective equipment. 
• Remediate broken long‐term home 
care services for the elderly. 
• Bank learning from COVID-19 in the 
form of a living and easily accessible 
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public repository, using the United 
Kingdom’s world-class digital 
humanities, library and archivist 
capacities. 
• Rethink isolationist policies, restore 
global leadership, and commit to 
global and international partnerships 
for coordinating public health 
responses. Build and support global 
institutions capable of coordinating 
international responses to pandemics, 
including revalorizing WHO. 
• Create a national data cooperative to 
support a pandemic data-sharing 
infrastructure and unlock through AI, 
digital innovation and technology the 
capacity of big data to assist in 
pandemic management.  
RESPONSE 
Fortify the resilience of those placed in 
harm’s way disproportionately due to 
ineffective and incompetent handling of 
the pandemic. 
• Conduct an independent public inquiry 
with full statutory powers and be 
prepared to ingest the findings of this 
inquiry without political restraint.  
• Strengthen real-time institutional 
checks on government incompetence, 
and call to account key actors who 
have mismanaged responses to the 
pandemic. 
• Scale and mainstream NHS Test and 
Track and undergird contact-tracing 
technology with a data trust agreement 
with democratic oversight. Roll back 
infringements to personal liberties and 
rights imposed during the pandemic, 
and prioritise data sovereignty.  
• Oversee an ethical and equitable 
distribution of COVID‐19 vaccines 
globally. 
7. Conclusion  
COVID‐19 provides further impetus for the 
liberal capitalist democratic politico‐
economic‐institutional model to transition 
to a better version of itself. So‐called ‘one 
in‐100‐year’ disasters are now occurring, it 
seems, once a decade or even more 
frequently! To endure, if not prosper, at 
the very least, this model will need to 
convince doubters that it is committed to 
preparing the world for a COVID‐20 or 
COVID‐21 and that it is up to the job. The 
United Kingdom could emerge from 
COVID‐19 emboldened if it embraces a 
more inclusive, just, and compassionate 
market economic model; restores social 
cohesion; reinvigorates democratic 
institutions; takes more seriously healthy 
aging, health inequalities, and 
communicable disease; and provides wise 
leadership by making and remaking 
generous and effective global 
partnerships. But regressive actions, such 
as embracing neoliberalism redux and 
introducing post-recession austerity and 
stringent fiscal discipline, could further 
diminish public trust and confidence in 
democratic institutions and push the 
country in a worrying direction.   
Neoliberalism has proven tenacious and 
well-equipped to prosper in inhospitable 
environments; after the global financial 
crash in 2007-8, market fundamentalism 
demonstrated a remarkable capacity to 
appropriate a crisis it was centrally 
implicated in causing, to gain further 
momentum and entrenchment. But it 
would be a mistake to construe any 
apparent continuity, pre- and post-crash, 
as a simple reset after a shock or a blip; 
instead, it has to be viewed as an active, 
historically novel, contested and ultimately 
vulnerable reinvention and reimagining. 
The United Kingdom’s ongoing regulatory 
reorganisations, redesigns and 
recalibrations are best understood as less 
a fix and more a contingent process: a 
creative invention, still in mutation, 
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provisional and vulnerable to contestation. 
Crises invite scrutiny of the place-specific 
structuration of already existing neoliberal 
institutions; the regulatory experiments 
which are generated in response; and the 
invention and institutionalisation of novel 
and embryonic neoliberal designs as 
recovery unfolds.  As Arundhati Roy 
notes: 
‘Our minds are still racing back and forth, 
longing for a return to “normality”, trying to 
stitch our future to our past and refusing to 
acknowledge the rupture. But the rupture 
exists. And in the midst of this terrible 
despair, it offers us a chance to rethink the 
doomsday machine we have built for 
ourselves. Nothing could be worse than a 
return to normality. Historically, pandemics 
have forced humans to break with the past 
and imagine their world anew. This one is 
no different. It is a portal, a gateway 
between one world and the next.’ 
(Arundhati Roy The pandemic is a portal, 
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Figure 6  
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Appendix 2. Conjectures and refutations: in search of the causes of the United 
Kingdom’s exceptionally high COVID-19 death toll  
 
Risk = Exposure x Vulnerability (Immunity Status + Susceptibility + 






Could COVID-19’s geographies reflect uneven exposure to the pathogen SARS- nCoV-2 2019 and 
variations from place to place in viral load?  
 
Impact of the fundamental conditions which prevail in OECD countries wedded to market 
fundamentalism and in particular in deeply neoliberal United Kingdom. 
 
Risk arises from geographical proximity to epidemiological events. Scholars of (re-)emerging 
infectious diseases argue that globalising capitalism and its attendant socioeconomic and 
socioecological changes (industrialisation, rapid urbanisation, transportation,  forest clearance and 
biodiversity loss, mining and the plundering of nature for natural resources, pollution and global 
warming, growing mountains of waste, etc.) have shaken free dormant viruses from the natural 
habitats they were previously trapped or locked in and created a more hospitable environment for 
the incubation and proliferation of these viruses. If true, OECD countries bear significant 
responsibility for (re-)emerging infectious disease. A weddedness to rapid and endless GDP growth 
and a climate and ecological crisis have taken the planet to the edge of ecocide. Moreover, it is 
certainly clear that SARS- nCoV-2 2019 has spread unevenly and mutated in virulence variously 
over space; not every country has been equally exposed to the pandemic. Globalising capitalism 
and command-and-control nodes in the global economy (like London) have presided over 
particularly poor outcomes. Advanced economies, hard-wired into global circuits of fast-moving 
capital, predicated upon the hyper-mobility of goods and people, and organised around large global 
cities in which urban planning and public health have long since divorced, have turbo-charged the 
transmission of SARS- nCoV-2 2019. The dense mesh of capillaries which emanate from these 
global nerve centres render them porous to pathogen transmission, mutation and infection and 
subject to heightened viral load. 
 
Conjecture 1: Societies whose position in the world economy demands that they 
function as critical nodes and hubs in global flows of people will be exposed to a 
greater number and variety of corridors of transition.   
 
Conjecture 2: Given its transmissibility, COVID-19 will thrive in countries with 
higher population densities and less space per capita. 
 
Conjecture 3: Given its transmissibility, urban density is the enemy of public 
health, and COVID-19 will thrive in more urbanised countries. 
 
Conjecture 4: Climatic cycles have conspired to increase the intensity of 
outbreaks of COVID-19 in the Global North.   
 
Conjecture 5: Uneven geographies of COVID-19 reflect mutations in SARS- 
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VULNERABILITY 
 
IMMUNITY STATUS  
 
Could COVID-19’s geographies reflect uneven immunity to the pathogen SARS- nCoV-2 2019 and 
variations from place to place in immunity status?  
  
Impact of the fundamental conditions which prevail in OECD countries wedded to market 
fundamentalism and in particular in deeply neoliberal United Kingdom. 
 
Although the human immune system is universal in its constitution, its robustness varies between 
societies – evolution and genetic lineage can mediate our innate (or natural or species) immunity; 
current life circumstances play a role in the evolution of our adaptive (or active or biography 
specific) immunity; and social interactions determine the extent of our passive (or borrowed or  
shared) immunity. In consequence, not everyone has an equally robust immune system. Most 
OECD countries have passed through demographic and epidemiological transition and are 
characterised by older population profiles, populations who are burdened by health inequalities, and 
significant COVID-19 linked comorbidities. Many have discontinued mass BCG vaccination 
programmes. Moreover, the ‘sterile’ western body, dwelling in hyper-sanitised environments, has 
become in some way less fortified and potentially even immunocompromised. 
 
Conjecture 6: Uneven geographies of COVID‐19 reflect historical and racial 
differences in immunity to SARS (‐like) viruses.    
 
Conjecture 7: Uneven geographies of COVID‐19 reflect historical and socio-
economic differences in immunity to SARS(‐like) viruses 
 
Conjecture 8: Given their ageing demographic structures, North American and 
European populations have been more vulnerable to COVID-19.  
 
Conjecture 9: Because COVID-19 linked co-morbidities vary between 
populations, so too there exists an uneven geography of vulnerability to COVID-
19.   
 
Conjecture 10: Government policies towards Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) 
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SUSCEPTIBILITY  
 
Could COVID-19’s geographies reflect uneven susceptibility to being impacted by the pathogen 
SARS- nCoV-2 2019 by dint of variations from place to place in social, economic and political 
conditions? 
 
Impact of the fundamental conditions which prevail in OECD countries wedded to market 
fundamentalism and in particular in deeply neoliberal United Kingdom. 
 
Although variegated exposure to hazards remains a crucial risk factor, increasingly it is recognised 
that it is primarily social, economic, and political forces that turn natural hazards into disasters and 
disasters into catastrophes. COVID‐19 is less a freak of nature or act of god and more a socially 
produced hazard event, that has been made to be a disaster or a catastrophe only in certain places. 
Social, political, cultural and economic processes marginalise and impoverish some social groups to 
the extent that their existence is so precarious that small setbacks have significant consequences. 
The vicissitudes and existential precarities of late capitalism (not least its endless and socially 
painful cycles of boom and bust) are exerting a historically unprecedented toll on human health and 
well-being: the social determinants of poor physical and mental health are today coalescing in 
especially intense ways in disempowered, disadvantaged, ‘left-behind’ communities, creating class, 
gender and race-based health inequalities and co-morbidities into which COVID-19 is playing. 
Highly centralised nation-states, growing socio-spatial inequalities, rising populist and nationalist 
movements, diminishing social coherence, declining trust in politicians and faltering democratic 
polities, increasingly polarised and polarising politics, increasingly isolationist policies, and a more 
inhospitable climate for those deemed ‘other’ and ‘foreign’, have offered a perfect petri-dish for 
COVID-19. A penetration of market relations (predicated upon maximising shareholder value (MSV) 
into every aspect of economic and social life has weakened community and diminished the welfare 
state and care-giving. Unsustainable human ecologies (including the building of ever‐larger cities 
whose chaotic expansion, poor quality built environments, and frantic and frenetic everyday rhythms 
are taxing the structure and functioning of the human central nervous system) are becoming 
manifest in a global mental health crisis. 
 
Conjecture 11: The uneven impact of COVID‐19 is rooted in growing socio‐
spatial income and wealth inequalities.  
 
Conjecture 12: Authoritarian regimes which command public trust have been 
more able to mobilise and give effect to stringent public health controls than 
democratic governments which have lost their social licence. 
 
Conjecture 13: Centralised political systems which govern regions and cities from 
a distance preside over poorer outcomes than federalised states with 
decentralised / devolved powers and bespoke localised responses.  
 
Conjecture 14: The uneven impact of COVID-19 is rooted in the demise of social 
cohesion; countries where social capital, solidarity, mutuality and reciprocity have 
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PREPAREDNESS 
 
Could COVID-19’s geographies reflect uneven geographies of institutional capacity, especially the 
quality of already existing disaster risk management institutions, infrastructure, resources and plans, 
and the strength of co-ordinated emergency response systems? 
 
Impact of the fundamental conditions which prevail in OECD countries wedded to market 
fundamentalism and in particular in deeply neoliberal United Kingdom. 
 
The calibre of prior disaster risk management institutions, plans and infrastructure plays a significant 
role in the production of vulnerability. The ability of a society to cope with a hazard event is a 
function of competencies in the areas of disaster preparation (the quality of forecasts and early 
warning systems), disaster management (the readiness of emergency and humanitarian services to 
evacuate; provide medical support; conduct search and rescue; provide temporary shelter; 
distribute food supplies, and maintain law and order), and disaster recovery (the availability of 
resources to rebuild and repair communities and infrastructure; social insurance schemes). Wealthy 
societies generally have stronger institutions and superior systems of governance and are better 
able to engage in long-term planning. Lesser developed societies, in contrast, tend to suffer from 
weak and failing institutions and poorer governance, and as a consequence find it difficult to 
formulate and implement long-term disaster mitigation plans. So why the COVID-19 geographies 
reported above? Could it be that austerity has weakened Global North disaster risk management? 
Could it be that COVID-19 has demanded remediating actions which lie beyond already existing 
capacity? Could it be that erroneous assumptions and perhaps even complacency have led to an 
underestimating of the risks posed by infectious disease? 
 
Conjecture 15: Countries with institutional capacity to give effect to disaster risk 
reduction plans and with effective co-ordinated emergency management have 
escaped the worst of COVID-19. 
 
Conjecture 16: Countries with well-established and high performing medical and 
public health services will be better able to suppress the COVID-19 pandemic; 
those with inadequate health care systems will suffer most.     
 
Conjecture 17: Health care and public health systems in Western OECD 
countries are designed to remediate degenerative disease and lack the 
institutional capacity and disaster risk management infrastructure needed to tackle 
airborne infectious disease. 
 
Conjecture 18: Societies with more experience in handling communicable 
disease and disease outbreaks have stronger muscle memory and have been 
able to respond more quickly and effectively. 
 
Conjecture 19: Transition to a services-based economy and offshoring of 
manufacturing alongside private ownership of the means of production have 
reduced industrial capacity in OECD countries and increased the difficulty of 
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RESPONSE 
 
Could COVID-19’s geographies simply reflect variations in the competency of governments and in 
particular the inadequacy of some government responses? Might it reflect, in particular, limitations 
and competency shortfalls within populist governments? 
 
Impact of the fundamental conditions which prevail in OECD countries wedded to market 
fundamentalism and in particular in deeply neoliberal United Kingdom. 
 
OECD responses have been characterised by government mismanagement: too many OECD 
countries – including and in particular the United Kingdom – responded too late and have presided 
over inept lockdowns, social distancing, mask wearing, PPE procurement and test, track and tracing 
programmes (the United Kingdom’s £37bn test, track and trace systems have proven to be an 
expensive investment without consequential impact). Populist governments have found it especially 
difficult to reconcile the imposition of state-led public health mandates with the protection of civil 
liberties and freedoms cherished not least by their own political bases. The rise of corporate media 
and social media has led to a post‐truth ‘digital’ public realm, obfuscated public understanding of the 
policies and performance of political leaders, made it harder for science to gain respect and 
authority, and diminished democratic accountability. Privatisation and austerity have led too many 
OECD countries to have a broken long-term care home sector for the elderly, and too many 
adopted a morally unjustifiable triage system in which the elderly were placed at the end of the 
queue. As ever, cornucopian beliefs and confidence in technological solutions lie at the heart of the 
OECD’s response; in this case hope is resting on the rapid production of a safe and effective 
vaccine. Whilst an effective vaccine has enabled the United Kingdom to recover lost ground, is it 
‘too little too late’? Will a ‘United Kingdom First’ vaccine roll-out serve the United Kingdom well in 
the long run? 
 
Conjecture 20: COVID-19 geographies arise from variations in the efficacy of 
governments’ public health responses: those that have gone hard and gone early 
have enjoyed greater success in the suppression of the virus.      
 
Conjecture 21: COVID-19 geographies will be inflated in countries which fail to 
provide meaningful income support, affordable finance and debt relief.     
 
Conjecture 22: The extent of COVID-19 deaths in long-term care homes (LTCH) 
in European and North American countries points to their moral failure to protect 
vulnerable elderly groups.   
 
Conjecture 23: Weakened by populist governments, the West has failed to show 
global leadership and this failure to step up has boomeranged back and caused 
self-harm.   
 
Conjecture 24: As we reach the end of the pandemic cycle, new COVID‐19 
geographies are emerging as a reflection of the ownership and distribution of safe 
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Data Resources 
This report makes substantial use of data culled from a variety of sources that are listed in 
the addendum.   
It makes particular use of Our World in Data charts: https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus 
Important websites providing authoritative data and analysis of COVID-19 and its geographies 
include: 
• World Health Organization https://www.who.int/ 
• Association of American Geographers http://www.aag.org/COVID-19TaskForce 
• World Bank https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/coronavirus 
• International Monetary Fund https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19 
• European Union https://europa.eu/european-union/coronavirus-response_en 
• US Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/index.html 
• The Lancet Journal https://www.thelancet.com/coronavirus 
• The British Medical Journal https://www.bmj.com/coronavirus 
• The UK Office for National Statistics https://www.ons.org/coronavirus 
• Johns Hopkins University https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/ 
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